Responding to recent studies that have argued that urban regime analysis (URA) is inappropriate for studying urban politics in Europe or in the twenty-first century, this article argues that URA is a powerful analytical tool to understand the dynamics of contemporary urban governance. It does so by drawing on evidence from the Swiss cities of Zurich and Bern since the turn of the millennium. In both cities, the realization of major urban projects has relied on strong public-private cooperation structured around the mobilization and exchange of five resources ("land," "law," "money," "expertise," and "democratic support"). Drawing on this empirical evidence, the article concludes by presenting two types of regimes: the PRIVATEpublic regime and the PUBLIC-private regime.
Introduction
Urban regime analysis (URA) has established itself as a dominant paradigm in the field of urban politics, but it has faced increasing criticism in recent times. Moreover, scholars have often been unclear about what distinguishes 1 University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland regimes from other forms of governance arrangement. In a recent contribution clarifying this boundary, Pierre (2014) states that URA is too centered on the U.S. postwar era and is thus insensitive to change. He concludes that urban governance (UG) provides a more suitable framework for the study of contemporary urban politics on both sides of the Atlantic. However, Pierre draws his conclusion mostly from theoretical arguments rather than empirical evidence and ignores the rising number of European studies that have relied on URA in the last decade. Therefore, the first goal of this article is to test whether URA really is outdated and Americano-centrist by applying both frameworks to the evolution of governance mechanisms in two Swiss cities (Zurich and Bern) since the turn of the millennium.
The second goal of this article is to contribute to filling a "resource gap" within both frameworks. Indeed, neither of them clearly specifies which resources have to be mobilized and exchanged by public and private actors to conclude governing arrangements that are capable of implementing commonly defined policy goals. Drawing on the notion of resources exchange identified by Stone in Regime Politics, this article investigates how public and private actors have mobilized and exchanged five resources ("land," "law," "money," "expertise," and "democratic support") to realize major urban projects in both cities. As this empirical analysis reveals similar patterns of resource exchange between the local government and large business corporations in several projects, the article concludes that regimes have formed in Zurich and Bern over the last 15 years. However, Zurich's PRIVATE-public regime is based on starkly different forms of resource exchange than Bern's PUBLIC-private regime. Thus, the article concludes that resources exchange provides a new criterion to distinguish types of regime that seems more relevant than the policy agenda in the postindustrial era.
The argument is structured as follows. First, I reconsider the overlap between UG and URA by showing that recent work has moved them in opposite directions on Sartori's ladder of abstraction. Second, I detail the "resource gap" of both frameworks and argue that this theoretical gap is even more problematic for URA. Third, I trace the evolution of major urban projects in Zurich and Bern to identify the configurations of resource exchange underlying them. Finally, I conclude that these cities are currently governed by two contrasting types of regime and discuss the differences between them and their implications for further research applying the URA framework.
Increasing Overlap Between UG and URA
In recent times, American scholars have heavily criticized URA for overlooking the increasing constraints cities face in the current globalized world (Judd and Laslo 2013; Pierre 2014) , for being unable to travel outside America (Judd and Laslo 2013; Pierre 2014) , or even for isolating urban politics from political science (Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe 2007) . Responding to criticism, Stone has reconsidered his original work several times (Stone 2001 (Stone , 2005 (Stone , 2013 and has greatly contributed to clarifying its core properties. Nevertheless, he seems to have finally surrendered in a recent contribution, in which he suggests to abandon the urban regime concept for that of "urban political order" (Stone 2015) . Thus, it seems that the academic funeral of URA has occurred in America.
In contrast, URA has gained increasing recognition in Europe where urban scholars have perceived it as a strong analytical tool taking into consideration the declining role of nation states and the rise of neoliberalism (e.g., Blanco 2015; Gullberg and Kaijser 2004; Pinson 2010; Ravazzi and Belligni 2016) . However, such a stark contrast between the two sides of the Atlantic is mainly the result of divergent views on how to apply the regime framework. European scholars have been less strict in their application of the concept. They have referred primarily to its iron-law, namely how public and private actors define common agendas and share resources to achieve them (Stoker 1995, p. 61; Stone 1993, p. 17) . Doing so, they have occasionally overlooked the longevity criterion and confused regimes with other forms of governance. On the contrary, American scholars have given more importance to the structuralist component of regimes and have shown that most regimes that had ruled cities in the postwar industrial era fell apart in the mid-1980s (Stone and Stoker 2015) .
This discrepancy between the two sides of the Atlantic has not been reduced by comparative studies (Savitch and Kantor 2002; Sellers 2002) . This is linked with the fact that the boundary between URA and the more general framework of "urban governance" has always been blurred. For instance, Pierre and Peters (2012) constantly refer to Regime Politics as one of the first major empirical studies applying the UG framework. In a recent contribution, Pierre (2014) seeks to clarify this boundary. He first makes clear that an urban regime is a particular form of UG. Then, he provides a more precise definition of UG by explicitly linking two criteria which were not necessarily linked in previous definitions: the mobilization of resources and the existence of a common policy agenda. Finally, and most importantly, Pierre identifies two criteria which remain unspecified in UG, but are clearly specified by URA. A regime requires (1) a strong involvement of both local government and the business sector, and (2) a relative stability and longevity of public-private cooperation (Pierre 2014, pp. 867 and 875) .
So far, so good. However, the problem is that, at the same time, the URA framework has also been modified. Although they fully recognize that the exercise of power has become less steady and that clear-cut progrowth agendas have disappeared, regime scholars have argued that these trends reinforce the analytical power of the iron-law of URA to study cities in the postindustrial era (Stone and Stoker 2015) . In other words, these scholars have deleted the two aforementioned criteria identified by Pierre (2014) . As a result, the overlap between UG and URA has been enlarged by recent work, since UG descended Sartori's ladder of abstraction, 1 while URA climbed it. Figure 1 sketches this overlap by showing how the definitions of both concepts have moved over time.
Which Resources Are Relevant to Conclude Governing Arrangements?
Besides the issue of the overlap presented in Figure 1 , UG and URA also share a problematic lack of clarity on a common core feature: the resource criterion. Although both frameworks conceive the exchange of resources between public and private actors as important, neither UG nor URA specifies clearly which resources have to be exchanged to form coalitions. Most of the time, scholars present an open list of resources that might be of relevance, but remain unclear whether some resources give more power to their holders than others, arguing that it depends on the agenda being pursued. 2 The problem is that such an answer provides poor insight for analyzing power relations within an actor network, especially if we consider that a resource may be anything that can be used to influence the behavior of another individual (Dahl 1961, p. 226) . This lack of clarity is even more problematic for URA as the latter explicitly considers the exchange of resources to be the glue 3 holding public and private partners together over the long term (Stone 2005, p. 329) , thereby enabling a governing coalition to exercise preemptive power. 4 In Regime Politics, Stone identifies resources exchange within Atlanta's biracial coalition. Put simply, the downtown business elite controls the economic sphere and is able to mobilize "land," "money," and "expertise." On the contrary, the local government provides "democratic support" and delivers building permits (resource "law") by controlling the political sphere (Stone 1989, pp. 192-93) . However, URA scholars have been less systematic on the identification of resource exchanges in subsequent work. Presenting his typology of regimes, Stone indicates that the control of legal bases, business investments, and development expertise are necessary to form a development regime, but does not specify the necessary resources for other types of regime (Stone 1993, pp. 18ss ). Meanwhile, some comparative studies have used the term "regime" to designate close public-private relationships in city governance, but without specifying resources exchange (e.g., DiGaetano and Lawless 1999; Dormois 2006; John and Cole 1998 (Pierre, 1999, p. 373 ).
(Pierre

1999)
"Urban governance simply defined, is about the formulation and pursuit of collective goals at the local level of the political system." (Pierre, Peters, 2012, p. 71) .
"[U]rban governance theory simply asks who controls the resources that are critical to governing and to what extent they can sustain collective action." (Pierre 2014, p. 867 ) "The 'iron-law' […] governing regime formation is that in order for a governing coalition to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda." (Stoker, 1995 , p. 61 quoting Stone, 1993 ; See also Stone, 2015, pp. 103 and 116) .
"Urban regimes are coalitions based on informal networks as well as formal relationships, and they have the following core properties:
• partners drawn from government and nongovernmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation*;
• collaboration based on social production-the need to bring together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks;
• identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants in the coalition;
• a longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition." (Mossberger, Stoker, 2001, p. 829 ; see also Stone, 2005, p. 329 ).
*From this, I draw the two first criteria on the right (see Pierre, 2014 ).
Sartori's ladder of abstraction
High-level of abstraction Medium-level of abstraction Atlanta's coalition (Stone, 1989 Figure 1 . Overlap between UG and URA on the ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970 (Sartori , p. 1044 .
Note. UG = urban governance; URA = urban regime analysis.
term "resources" to refer to contextual variables influencing the bargaining position of cities in a globalized context instead of referring to arrangements and exchanges made within a governing coalition (Savitch and Kantor 2002) . In the end, the general explanation about regime formation only stipulates that business actors bring economic resources and local authorities bring political resources to the governing coalition (Mossberger and Stoker 2001, p. 813) . Nevertheless, as stressed by Imbroscio (1998) , this view is reductive because it assumes a rigid division of labor between state and market actors. Doing so, it fails to acknowledge that municipalities also own many forms of infrastructure (e.g., airports, stadiums, mass transit systems) and can play a more active role in governing their own cites.
Two Complementary Research Goals
Given the above theoretical considerations, this article pursues a double objective. First, it aims at testing empirically whether URA is helpful in the European context. Nevertheless, contrary to other European scholars who have used the concept with less strictness, I will avoid concept stretching by referring to an urban regime only if my empirical analysis reveals all the five criteria presented at the bottom of Figure 1 . Second, given the importance of resources exchange for regime building and continuity, I will pay particular attention to this point. Drawing on the work of Coleman (1964, chap. 6) and Dente (2014, p. 35) on the concept of political exchange, I assume that a resource exchange occurs when actor A, who is controlling resource X which is of interest to actor B, gives B access to X, in exchange of access to resource Y, which is of interest to A and was previously controlled only by B. Let me specify that it is also common that A and B decide to jointly mobilize a resource. For instance, shared funding of a new transport infrastructure through a public-private partnership (PPP) is a joint mobilization of the resource "money." Let me now justify my case selection on various aspects. First, I concentrate on Switzerland as it is a European country which has, like the United States, a federalist structure with three levels (the municipal level, the cantonal level which corresponds to the state level of the United States, and the federal level). Thus, I do not face the issue of the national state assuming a central role in urban policies that some scholars have observed in France or in the United Kingdom (Cochrane 2007; Davies 2003; Harding 1997; Le Galès 1995) . Second, I select the economic capital (Zurich) and the political capital (Bern) to explore whether this difference in status leads to a different division of labor between state and market actors in the two cities. Third, I focus on major urban projects, that is, projects representing a top priority for the local government and aiming to "produce the major changes in the landscapes of buildings and networks in a specific city region at a given time" (Gullberg and Kaijser 2004, p. 18) . Several scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have used such projects as a new unit of analysis to study UG (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003; Kühne 1997; Pinson 2009 ). This choice allows for a more precise identification of resources exchange at the project scale and clarifies the longevity criterion. I will consider that a city is governed by a regime only if I observe similar patterns of resource exchange between the municipal government and some business actors in several major projects. Finally, as they all play a key role in Regime Politics, my empirical analysis focuses on the five following resources: "land," "law," "money," "expertise," and "democratic support." Adopting a Weberian definition of power, I draw on the typology developed by Knoepfel and colleagues (Knoepfel 2017; Knoepfel et al. 2007, chap. 4) to define these five resources as follows.
"Land" refers to land property or to any use or disposal of land that has been given to a third party through a leasehold contract or other form of land easement. "Law" refers to the activation of any legal or regulatory base and is primarily in the hands of public authorities. However, private actors and individuals can also activate this resource if they appeal to a judicial court, for instance to contest a new planning regulation. In Switzerland, this phenomenon is rather common as property rights are highly protected by the legal system (see Varone and Nahrath 2014) . "Money" simply refers to the financial capacity of an actor and to its financial contribution to urban development policy. Regarding these two latter resources, Swiss municipalities benefit from strong autonomy in international comparison as they can set a part of their tax levels independently and control zoning regulation (Hesse 1991; Horber-Papazian and Jacot-Descombes 2014) . "Expertise" refers to the know-how and the skills of the personnel working for an actor. For instance, to own "expertise" in urban development, a municipality needs an administrative office that has skillful architects and urbanists. Finally, "democratic support" refers to the ability to gain democratic legitimacy by winning an election, a vote in Parliament, or a popular ballot. In Switzerland, the latter case is the most common as direct democratic institutions are particularly developed and allow any Swiss citizen to activate this resource through a referendum or a popular initiative (Vatter and Wirz 2014) .
In undertaking the research presented in the next two sections, I first drew on several primary sources (press articles, annual reports, project conventions, City Councils minutes, and voting documentation). I complemented these data with 24 semi-structured interviews conducted with mayors, business representatives, heads of administration, members of City Councils, or inhabitants associations between April 2013 and February 2015. A comprehensive list of the interviewees appears in the appendix.
Zurich
A Territorial Compromise Structuring the Planning Strategy for Decades
Zurich is the Swiss economic capital and the seventh most important financial center worldwide (Quatar Financial Centre Authority 2014). Swiss national transport infrastructure (highway, railway, and airway networks) is structured around the Zurich metropolis, and its dynamism has frequently been noted by urban planners (Eisinger and Reuther 2007) . However, Zurich's development has regularly been the subject of local controversy and conflict. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, Zurich's power structure was characterized by a strong tension between (1) a progrowth coalition composed of Swiss banks, insurance companies, landowners, and construction firms which was supported by right parties, and (2) an antigrowth coalition composed of inhabitants' associations invoking the Right to the City (Lefebvre 1968 ) that was backed by left parties (Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff 1995, pp. 241ss; Kühne 1997, pp. 186ss) . During this time, referenda and popular initiatives were regularly activated to settle conflicts (Cattacin 1994, pp. 88ss) . Both camps had their victories and defeats, but neither side was able to win decisively (Schmid 2006, p. 162) . This highly conflictual situation forced the authorities to reconsider their development strategy (Kühne 1997, pp. 19ss) . To preserve the downtown from high buildings and land speculation, they planned the office buildings necessary for the development of the financial sector in peripheral areas. Described as a "territorial compromise" (Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff 1995, pp. 242ss; Schmid 2006, p. 162ss) , this development strategy lasted until the end of the 1990s.
Unlike other western countries, the 1990s was a difficult decade for Switzerland which experienced periods of recession and stagnation of its gross domestic product (GDP) as well as a growing unemployment rate. The real-estate sector was particularly hit after an unprecedented growth during the 1980s (J.-C. Lambelet and Mihailov 1999) . As a consequence, Zurich's development experienced a significant slowdown and the municipal government started to worry about the financial and economic attractiveness of the city on the global stage. From August 1996 to May 1997, it organized several informal joint meetings with planning experts, prominent representatives of the business sector, inhabitants associations, and cantonal authorities. The goal of these talks, called Stadtforum, was to define a new development strategy for the city and its region, to sketch a new planning law, and most importantly, to create a less ideological and more pragmatic mode of public-private cooperation to unlock the renewal of industrial brownfields (Arras and Keller 1997) . Then, in 1998, an important change took place in the municipal government. The local minister in charge of urban planning and construction, Ursula Koch, who had been a leading figure of the leftist right-to-the-city coalition for 12 years, was replaced by Elmar Ledergerber. Ledergerber's main objectives were (1) to reaffirm the position of Zurich as a global city and (2) to restore the image of the municipal authorities, often negatively perceived by business actors as a brake on development during Koch's mandate (Interviewees 1, 3, 9, and 11). Ledergerber succeeded in overcoming the opposition which had made the implementation of a previous planning regulation impossible since 1992 and put a new planning law into force in 2000. With the help of the new head of the urban planning office Franz Eberhard, Ledergerber started cooperative planning procedures with large industrial companies which were restructuring their businesses into the production of services, including ABB or Sulzer 5 (see Eisinger and Reuther 2007, pp. 84ss; Güller and Schenkel 2002) . Ledergerber then became mayor in 2002, and Kathrin Martelli, whose philosophy was also progrowth, took charge of urban planning and construction.
In the meantime, the federal government transformed the Swiss Federal Railways (known as "SBB") 6 into a state-owned limited company and demanded that real-estate operations generate rents to partly finance the maintenance and the development of the railway network. This induced a radical shift in its real-estate strategy. For decades, SBB had perceived real estate only as a tool for developing the railway network and did not aim at planning and building new neighborhoods. However, since 2003, SBB has created an independent real-estate division which seeks to maximize profitability in the same way as any other real-estate developer (Gerber 2008a) . It currently leads dozens of urban projects all around Switzerland, especially in highly profitable locations in the metropolitan areas of Zurich and GenevaLausanne (see SBB 2016 for an overview of these current projects).
A Quick Agreement with SBB to Create a New CBD
Soon after the 2002 municipal elections, SBB contacted the municipal government to clarify its intentions about the future development of the area around Zurich's main station. SBB has owned almost all of the plots of land located in this area and could easily remove unused railway lines to make them available for construction. The railway company aimed at building a new central business district (CBD) south of the station named Europaallee to include 6,000 workplaces in the banking and food and retail sectors, a high school for teacher education hosting 2,000 students, 300 dwellings, and other public facilities such as a commercial center, a senior residence, a hotel, and several cinemas. However, as SBB knew that creating a new CBD next to the main station had been the most contested urban project in Zurich's history (Wolff 2012) , it wished to tightly cooperate with local authorities from the very beginning of the project to avoid opposition (Interviewee 2). Indeed, a long list of previous projects around the main station had been systematically blocked by the territorial compromise for four decades. In total, 80 million Swiss francs were invested in unfruitful planning from 1969 to 2001. 7 Under the leadership of Martelli and Ledergerber, the municipal government also pushed for rapid urban renewal around the central station. Indeed, some business actors considered this long period of unfruitful planning as a proof of the inability of local authorities to steer urban development and as a sign of the declining economic attractiveness of the city. Moreover, a majority of public opinion perceived the surroundings of the station to be unsafe (Interviewees 1, 6, and 9). As a result, SBB and the municipal government organized an international architectural competition to shape the contours of the future neighborhood, thereby jointly mobilizing the resource "expertise." In only six months, coalition partners designed a consensual project among urban planners and reached an agreement on a private land-use plan.
The municipality gave SBB the right to build 322,300 m 2 of gross floor area, that is, 22% more than the municipal zoning law would normally have provided, and forwent tax revenue on added land value. In exchange, SBB paid for all the construction costs including streets and public squares that would have normally been paid by the municipality and accepted the requirement to organize a specific architectural competition for every building, with members of the municipal urban planning office involved in the jury (City Council Zurich 2006) . In other words, the municipal government gave a legislative exception to the SBB to avoid a financial burden for the municipality and to ensure that the future CBD exhibited high architectural standards. Most importantly, coalition partners agreed to develop ad hoc legislation for Europaallee, which I interpret as a joint mobilization of the resource "law." In May 2005, they transmitted the private land-use plan to the City Council for approval.
Choosing to develop a private land-use plan instead of a public one is not insignificant. This choice theoretically forces the City Council to vote on the entire plan without modifying some details of the agreement made by SBB and the municipal government (Interviewee 5). However, the left parties, which held a majority of seats in the City Council, wished to increase the proportion of housing in the land-use plan. At first, the urban planning office was skeptical and invoked the federal regulation on noise abatement which contains several restrictions for the construction of dwellings next to railway lines (Interviewee 5.). Then, when the left parties threatened to reject the whole plan if their demand was not met, SBB agreed to negotiate and proposed to increase the proportion of dwellings from 20% to 40% in two buildings. Nevertheless, to keep the same level of profitability, SBB did not plan any affordable dwellings and instead proposed two buildings-a hotel and a luxury senior residence-which under cantonal legislation can be included in the proportion of housing. This strategy proved to be effective as after this minor modification, the City Council adopted the land-use plan unanimously in January 2006, thereby giving strong "political support" to the Europaallee project.
Despite this unanimity, inhabitants of the adjacent local district launched a referendum against the decision and succeeded in collecting the necessary signatures. They feared an excessive gentrification of the city center and denounced the very high real-estate gains which only generated profits for the SBB and provided nothing for the municipality (Interviewees 4 and 8) . Coalition partners took the opportunity offered by the voting campaign to promote the project and to highlight their close cooperation. They were very confident about the result of the ballot and never considered the possibility of losing it (Interviewee 1). They even saw it as an opportunity to get a stronger democratic legitimacy for their common development strategy (Interviewee 2).
In the end, 65.5% of the population supported the land-use plan in September 2006. After the ballot, some opponents who owned a building on the perimeter of the land-use plan area appealed to the Cantonal Court but their appeal was rejected. In other words, opponents tried to mobilize the resource "democratic support" and the resource "law" to block the project but both resources remained in the hands of coalition partners. The latter were very confident about their project after the unanimous vote of the City Council and knew that it would be very difficult for remaining opponents to stop its realization (Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10) . Indeed, SBB had already signed the lease contract with the high school for teacher education and launched the architectural competition for its future buildings several months before the vote. Construction work started in 2009, and the first buildings including new offices for the largest Swiss banks (UBS, Credit Suisse, Swisscanto) were inaugurated in 2012.
Cooperation with SBB Continues to Renew Industrial Brownfields
The success of the project Europaallee represents a turning point in Zurich's development history. A new CBD has finally been constructed next to the main station, putting an end to the territorial compromise that had prevailed for three decades. After this first achievement, SBB and the municipal government have continued to collaborate closely to develop and implement other renewal projects in several parts of the city (see Table 1 ). All these projects are being developed next to suburban railway stations located around the CBD. The governing coalition always follows a modus operandi similar to the one utilized in the case of Europaallee. SBB brings "money," "construction expertise," and most importantly, "land," as it can easily remove unused railways lines to make it available for construction. On the contrary, the early implication of the municipal government in the planning process brings "democratic support" by securing positive votes from the City Council and the local population if a referendum is held. Finally, "law" and "planning expertise" are jointly mobilized as coalition partners commonly elaborate land-use plans or other forms of specific regulation to limit intervention from the City Council and local inhabitants. This strategy recalls the one adopted by Atlanta's biracial coalition to prevent the entrance of new stakeholders in the coalition and keep it as narrow as possible (Stone 1989, p. 201) . In terms of power balance within the governing coalition, SBB clearly holds the most influential position as it determines the location of further urban development, sets its speed of progress, influences the legal bases to achieve it, and benefits from large land rents at the end of the day. Meanwhile, although the municipality avoids monetary expenses, it does not recover any part of the land rents that are generated, even if it takes an active role in the planning process. In the end, the gains for the local government are mainly urbanistic, as it demands specific architectural competitions for all the projects, each time with a member of the urban planning office involved in the jury.
Bern
A City with a Weak Tradition of Public-Private Cooperation
With 133,000 inhabitants, Bern is the Swiss capital, even if it is only the fifth most populated city of the country after Zurich, Geneva, Basle, and Lausanne. When the Swiss federal state was founded in 1848, Bern was explicitly chosen to counterbalance the economic weight of Zurich (Stadler 1971) . Thus, Bern is a typical "secondary capital city," namely a city hosting national political institutions without being the economic center of its country. However, unlike other secondary capital cities such as Canberra, Ottawa, The Hague, or Washington, D.C., Bern did not succeed in creating spill-over effects from its political status to create an attractive entrepreneurial environment . Its local economy is mostly nationally oriented, and 37% of the city labor force works in the public sector. 8 Even local politicians admit that the economic attractiveness of Bern will never be comparable with those of Zurich, Geneva, or Basle. Instead, to defend their position in the Swiss urban hierarchy, they emphasize the specific role that Bern plays as the political and administrative center of the country (Mayer et al. 2013, pp. 19ss) . As a result, until the beginning of the twenty-first century, Bern's locational politics were almost exclusively oriented towards an "asking-formoney" strategy and the municipal government prioritized public-public cooperation with federal and cantonal authorities over cooperation with business actors .
In addition to its political status, several other factors explain the weak tradition of public-private cooperation in Bern. First, unlike other large Swiss cities, Bern has no industrial tradition and has not been used to structure its urban planning strategy around the needs of large industrial firms. Second, Bern's local government has no need to cooperate with business actors to gain access to land resource since 64% of the city territory belongs to public bodies, the Bernese Burgergemeinde 9 (32%) and the municipality (22%) being the largest landowners (Arnet 1998, p. 125) . Third, in contrast to Zurich, the metropolitan area of Bern is characterized by a high level of institutional fragmentation because suburban municipalities have always resisted the transfer of significant competences to a metropolitan body. They fear that the municipality of Bern would become too powerful if they did so (Kübler and Koch 2008) . Thus, metropolitan policies tend to be weakly specified, especially in terms of economic promotion, because they require the approval of every involved municipality. Finally, because of the city's agrarian tradition, Bern's inhabitants have been even more antigrowth than their Zurich counterparts. Until the mid-1990s, preserving agricultural land has been a key priority for the local government (Municipality of Bern 1995) and the zoning of any plot of land as suitable for development has always generated intense political debates (Steiner 1998, p. 66) .
1990s: Growing Awareness of the Need to Cooperate with Business Actors
Through the 1990s, several trends made the local government progressively aware of the limits of its governing strategy based mostly on public-public cooperation. First, following the massive investments made by federal authorities in transport infrastructure, daily commuting flows have exploded since the 1970s, especially between major Swiss cities (Dessemontet, Kaufmann, and Jemelin 2010) . A journey from Bern to Zurich, Basle, or Lausanne currently lasts about one hour with a train leaving every 30 minutes. As a result, unlike other secondary capital cities, Bern's local authorities cannot convince businesses to settle in Bern arguing on the basis of spatial proximity to government agencies. Several businesses and NGOs prefer to locate their headquarters in Zurich, Geneva, or Basle to ensure closer links with international partners or national media 10 (Mayer et al. 2013, p. 146) . Moreover, to counterbalance this increased concentration of jobs and inhabitants in the three main metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle, and GenevaLausanne, the Swiss Parliament has decentralized several federal units away from Bern to boost the economy of peripheral regions.
As a result, Bern experienced a long period of urban decline from 1980 to 2000, and in contrast to other major Swiss cities, Bern's agglomeration also experienced a demographic stagnation during these two decades. In terms of jobs, the city benefited from an increase in the 1980s (+6.7%), but also experienced stagnation in the 1990s (+1.2%). This situation resulted in serious fiscal losses and created a public debt of 324.8 million Swiss francs-about 30% of the city's annual budget-in only one decade (Municipality of Bern 2015). As well as limiting its investment capacity, this debt put the local government under strong political pressure as a popular ballot is mandatory on the city annual budget as well as on any municipal expense exceeding seven million Swiss francs.
Finally, when the Swiss Parliament transformed both the SBB and the Swiss Post in state-owned limited companies at the end of the 1990s, it came as an electroshock for the local government which realized that federal authorities were rather indifferent to the position of the capital city in the Swiss urban hierarchy. Bern had to rely on its own resources to reverse decline and to raise its economic attractiveness. To do so, the local government has progressively shifted toward a progrowth strategy through the 2000s and has engaged in much deeper cooperation with private actors. As a result, major city extensions that had failed at the ballot box in previous decades became a reality (see Table 2 ). In the next section, I focus on the Wankdorf-City project as, besides its economic importance, its success was essential in symbolic terms. To further position the city as the political and administrative center of Switzerland, it was indeed fundamental to maintain the head office of SBB and the Swiss Post in Bern, especially because both companies were no longer legally bound to stay in the capital and had already considered other possible locations (Interviewees 17, 23, and 24).
Wankdorf-City: A New Business District Hosting 5,000 Workplaces
Located on the territory of Bern and two suburban municipalities, the Wankdorf has been identified since 1989 as the largest suitable area for the concentration of economic activities in the Canton of Bern. However, in the 1990s, its fragmented institutional configuration and its complex distribution of land ownership (main landowners are the Burgergemeinde, the Municipality of Bern, the Canton of Bern, the Swiss Confederation, and the SBB) led to regular conflicts between public bodies about the funding of transport infrastructure and the regulation of traffic flows (Sager 2002, pp. 191ss) . As a result, the densification of the area came into deadlock.
In the early 2000s, two main changes unlocked planning procedures. First, to spur municipalities and public landowners to take an active role in the densification process instead of blocking it, the cantonal government introduced a new policy instrument regulating motorized traffic flows. A quota of daily traffic flows is attributed to each area in which development may take place and, as soon as a future construction generates traffic flows exceeding the quota, the cantonal administration no longer issues building permit in the area. As a consequence, this system generates strong competition among landowners as each landowner fears being unable to proceed if it builds too late (Interviewee 13). Second, a suburban train station was finally realized in the Wankdorf when SBB, which had blocked the project for 10 years, realized that it could take advantage of the new station to generate real-estate profit (Interviewee 19) . Inaugurated in 2004, this station connects the Wankdorf to Bern's main station in three minutes and makes development in the area even more attractive and profitable than before.
To keep the advantage of being the first landowner to build in the area, the local government proposed the development of Wankdorf-City, a new office complex next to the railway station. Choosing this location for further development had the great advantage of avoiding opposition from inhabitants as no housing was located next to it (Interviewees 14 and 21). The local government first played a double game by modifying the zoning law to allow a higher density rate on the surroundings of the new station and therefore increase the value of its own land plots (Gerber 2008b, p. 49) . Second, it established a land-use plan for the area and submitted it to a popular ballot with the new zoning law. On these two points, a popular vote was not mandatory, but citizens had to validate the municipal funding for the new train station. Therefore, the local government decided to submit a package with the three objects to the verdict of voters. In February 2003, 86% of the voters endorsed the package and gave a strong democratic legitimacy to the whole development strategy of the municipality from its earliest stages of planning.
Then, the local government convinced three companies to fund the new business district and to locate their head offices in it: the SBB, the Swiss Post, and Losinger-Marazzi. The latter is one of the leading Swiss construction firms which already had privileged relations with the municipality as it has been based in Bern since 1917 and constructed the new football stadium inaugurated in the Wankdorf in 2006 (Interviewee 20). As the municipality did not wish to assume the financial risk linked to the building of the office complex, it signed land lease contracts with SBB and Losinger-Marazzi which took charge of construction costs. However, to control the realization phase and to be involved in the juries of the architectural competitions, the municipality funded public infrastructure (roads, public squares, and connection to water, electricity, and gas supply networks) (Interviewees 13, 14, and 21) . All these steps required three additional popular ballots between 2003 and 2010, but voters were coherent with their initial vote and systematically supported the strategy of the local government with a comfortable majority. The headquarters of the SBB were inaugurated in summer 2014, the ones of the Swiss Post in summer 2015, and the ones of Losinger-Marazzi at the end of 2016. In the meantime, the municipality had already finalized the planning of an extension of Wankdorf-City foreseeing 2,000 additional workplaces and 150 dwellings by 2019. Land lease contracts were signed with SBB, LosingerMarazzi, and the insurance company Die Mobiliar 11 in 2014, and 75% of voters supported this extension in June 2016.
2000s: Increasing Public-Private Cooperation with a Similar Modus Operandi
Besides Wankdorf-City, Bern's local government has developed several other major city extension projects through public-private cooperation since the turn of the millennium (see Table 2 ). All these projects are similar in terms of resources exchange between the local government and its private partners. Thanks to an important land acquisition policy initiated in the 1960s and to its privileged relationships with the Burgergemeinde (Arnet 1998; Interviewees 14, 16, 21, and 22) , the municipality has easy access to the land resource. Then, it activates the legal resource and elaborates specific land-use plans zoning its own land plots into development areas or increasing building density to make them attractive to investors. Most of the time, the local government also mobilizes "expertise" and "money" in the planning phase as its urban planning office is in charge of elaborating the land-use plan and assumes planning costs.
A crucial step for the local government is to gain enough "democratic support," as every project has to be approved by voters. The general strategy is to schedule popular ballots at the earliest stages of planning to conserve room for maneuver in choosing investors and in negotiating implementation. Moreover, through zoning modifications and land lease rents paid by investors, the municipality secures financial gains covering planning and public infrastructure costs, or even largely exceeding them in the long run. 12 Thus, financial aspects are generally rather secondary during popular campaigns, the central issue being to convince antigrowth voters wishing to preserve The municipality buys the land and takes the lead in planning
Source. Messages addressed by the local government to the voters and field interviews.
agrarian and green land at the periphery of the city. To persuade a majority of the population, the municipality either (1) renews brownfields to which inhabitants are not emotionally attached (Wankdorf, Gaswerkareal) or (2) links densification projects to the construction of family housing and public parks (Brünnen, Viererfeld) . Overall, this strategy has proved to be effective as Viererfeld has been the only project to generate significant political contestation since 2000.
Once it has won a popular ballot related to its project, the local government benefits from a monopoly of resources regarding the planning stage. Therefore, it can choose the investors it wishes to cooperate with and determine precisely the realization tasks it delegates to them. In the first projects, local politicians prioritized investors who already had long-term relationships with the municipality, namely SBB, the Swiss Post, or LosingerMarazzi. Then, over the years, the local government has built mutual understanding with new private partners such as Die Mobiliar or Swiss Prime Site, 13 thanks to the fact that several office directors having previously worked for real-estate promoters have been hired by the municipal administration since 2005.
Two Regimes, but a Starkly Different Distribution of Resources
My empirical analysis of the implementation of major urban projects in Zurich and Bern since the turn of the millennium reveals that both cities are currently governed by some form of regime. Indeed, in both cities, I observed (1) a strong involvement of both the local government and some business actors, and (2) a longevity of cooperation structured around a pattern of resources exchange repeating itself in several projects. Thus, the cases of Zurich and Bern meet the five criteria mentioned at the bottom of Figure 1 and clearly fit in the URA framework. The UG framework would not predict that in both cities, over the last 15 years, the capacity to act would have been concentrated in the hands of a small group of actors encompassing the local government and large firms such as SBB, 14 Losinger-Marazzi, or Swiss Prime Site. These firms are not active in every single urban project conducted in the two cities nor are they able to impose their views on every controversial issue, but they control critical resources such as "land," "money," or "expertise" that make them attractive partners for municipalities. In other words, in both cities, a coalition including these firms and the local government has the capacity to exercise preemptive power.
Some might argue that the coalitions I observed are still too young to be called regimes. Although I recognize that Zurich's and Bern's coalitions certainly hold less structural power than Atlanta's coalition in the postwar era, the key issue for a governing coalition is not whether it lasts for 10, 20, or 30 years, but rather whether it is able to cope with social changes to overcome opposition (see Stone 2013, p. 22 ). Zurich's and Bern's coalitions have both done so. After having formed around the pursuit of a clear-cut progrowth agenda, translated into the projects Europaallee and Wankdorf-City, both coalitions have slightly enlarged their agenda in subsequent projects by including parks, percentages of affordable housing or by organizing participatory planning with inhabitants. However, these adaptations were rather ways of securing victories in popular ballots to keep enough "democratic support." The progrowth priority is far from having disappeared and those who have exercised resistance to the governing coalitions in both cities are the first to acknowledge that they have engaged in a largely unequal political battle (Interviewees 4, 5, 8, and 15) .
Similar strategies of agenda enlargement have been observed by other scholars in recent work (e.g., Ravazzi and Belligni 2016; Stone and Stoker 2015) . Thus, it seems that policy agendas cannot anymore serve as the main criterion to distinguish types of urban regime (see Stone 1993) . On this point, my two case studies are particularly helpful as they reveal starkly different patterns of resource exchange which I have labeled PRIVATE-public and PUBLIC-private regimes (see Table 3 ). Both types of regime can successfully implement major urban projects, but differ starkly on three core aspects: (1) who brings which resource to the coalition, (2) who holds the most influential position within the coalition, and finally, (3) how the coalition deals with the people or social groups opposing its projects.
In a PRIVATE-public regime, business actors initiate projects thanks to their land property, their financial resources, and their construction expertise. The municipal government comes in later to complement the resources at the disposal of the coalition. Its main task is to secure the support of the City Council and of the local population. Another peculiarity of PRIVATE-public regimes is the joint mobilization of the legal resource. Planning regulations are commonly elaborated in ways that allow private partners to benefit from several legislative exceptions, increasing the profitability of their projects. In exchange, the municipal government receives important private contributions to finance public infrastructure and can reduce its own expenses to a minimum. Finally, in PRIVATE-public regimes, the coalition overcomes opposition and secures democratic legitimacy on an ex-post basis. Key decisions are made at the very beginning of the project between the Executive Committees of the investors and the municipal government. Then, public-private agreements are submitted to the City Council as a package to limit parliamentary intervention and, in the case of a referendum, the same package is submitted to the voters. After these two steps have been successfully completed, it becomes almost impossible for remaining opponents to prevent the coalition from realizing its project. Overall, the PRIVATE-public regime resembles the development regime observed by Stone in Atlanta on several points.
In contrast, in PUBLIC-private regimes, the local government takes the initiative as it owns unbuilt plots of land and often plays a double game by zoning these plots into development areas. Then, it defines the broad outline of the renewal and establishes its legal framework on its own. Private actors enter the process only at the realization stage, bringing their financial resources and their construction expertise to the coalition. Finally, in PUBLIC-private regimes, the local government overcomes opposition and secures democratic legitimacy on an ex-ante basis. It chooses a project location that will not raise significant protest from inhabitants and submits the project to the City Council and to the voters from an early stage of planning. Thanks to this strategy, the local government holds the most influential position within the coalition and is able to constrain private partners to accept agreements on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This last point recalls an important feature of progressive regimes. However, PUBLIC-private regimes are overall much closer to local-statist regimes that have been theorized by Imbroscio (1998, p. 243) , but never proved to be a viable empirical alternative in America. The case of Bern reveals that such a regime is perfectly viable in the European context and suggests that URA has certainly been too Americanocentrist by taking private land ownership as an axiom.
As it draws from only two case studies, this typology is obviously not fixed. Future research is required to test it further and will certainly add resources or regime types. Further research might also clarify whether some resources are more likely to be embedded in regime formation than others. Such work goes well above the ambition of this article. The main point I sought to make with this typology is that the resource criterion should reemerge as the starting unit of analysis, both in UG and URA frameworks. This means that the continuity of regimes has now to be primarily evaluated according to the ways in which recurring patterns of resource exchange produce policy outputs and not necessarily according to the policy agenda or to the fact that the same private partners remain in the coalition. This resource-based approach also facilitates cross-national comparisons as, unlike actors whose existence and role depend strongly on the national institutional framework, resources presented in the typology of Knoepfel and colleagues (Knoepfel 2017; Knoepfel et al. 2007 ) are fixed units of analysis that can be identified along similar lines in most democratic countries. 15 However, arguing that actors are more context dependent than resources does not mean that the latter are completely separated from the institutional framework. For instance, the resources "land" and "democratic support" are crucial to understand my Swiss case studies because they allow Bern's municipal government to benefit from a larger capacity to act than its Zurich counterpart, even though Zurich benefits from a much more attractive economic environment. 16 Nevertheless, these two resources would certainly be slightly less important in other countries where expropriation is more regularly put into force and where direct democratic institutions are activated only by the authorities (e.g., France). Thus, further cross-national research adopting a resource perspective is required to distinguish resources that matter in UG from resources that do not, thereby avoiding the pluralist trap stating that everything can become a resource. A first attempt in this direction including case studies in France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States has recently been conducted. It notably shows that the decisive influence of "land" and "democratic support" on the power relations between public and private actors also exists in several other contexts (S. Lambelet and Pflieger 2016) .
Conclusion
This article aimed to test the relevance of two theoretical frameworks to understand the political dynamics of the Swiss cities of Zurich and Bern: the urban governance framework (UG) and the urban regime framework (URA). Investigating how major urban projects have been implemented in both cities since the turn of the millennium, I observed that the success of these projects relied on stable power relations between the local government and large firms structured around the mobilization and the exchange of five critical resources ("land," "law," "money," "expertise," and "democratic support"). Given that UG predicts neither a longevity of cooperation with the same business partners, nor a strong involvement of local politicians in governing arrangements, I concluded that URA is more effective in explaining current governance dynamics in these two cities. Therefore, contrary to what has been argued recently by other scholars, I conclude that URA is definitely able to travel to Europe and remains a powerful analytical tool to understand urban politics in the twenty-first century.
URA has evolved significantly since the publication of Regime Politics and can be expected to continue to do so. My proposition to switch the analysis from policy agendas to patterns of resource exchange to distinguish types of regimes is a step in this direction. In recent times, several scholars have made similar attempts to revitalize the concept. Some have identified regimes at the metropolitan scale (Hamilton 2004) or regimes including state actors (Burns 2003 (Burns , 2010 Morel 2016) . Others have focused on the ways in which governing coalitions adapt either to the rise of nonprofit actors (Jones-Correa and Wong 2015) or to larger political and economic changes induced by globalization (Rast 2015; Stone 2015) . Instead of being accused of concept stretching (see Judd and Laslo 2013) , these scholars should be praised for their efforts to adapt URA to the study of contemporary politics. It is certainly true that several studies have stretched the regime concept, but they have contributed to clarifying its core proprieties (see Mossberger and Stoker 2001) . If urban politics is really isolated from other subfields in political science (see Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe 2007) , it is certainly not because URA has been a dominant paradigm for too long, but rather because several scholars have maintained a very narrow definition of the concept and have preferred to reduce conceptual clarity by constantly inventing new types of governance. Urban regimes such as the one of Atlanta may be dead long ago, but scholars should avoid throwing out the baby with the bathwater. 8 . This percentage includes all people working in the public administration, for the military, in health and education services, and for social insurances (Municipality of Bern 2015, 89). 9. In the canton of Bern, Burgergemeinden are recognized by the cantonal constitution as public bodies contributing to social and cultural prosperity, although they resemble bourgeoisies and have no democratic legitimacy. In the city of Bern, the role of the Burgergemeinde is particularly relevant, as it owns about one-third of land property over the municipal territory. 10. As they are organized around the three linguistic communities, Swiss national media are based in Zurich, Geneva, Lausanne, and Lugano. 11. Based in Bern, Die Mobiliar is one the largest Swiss insurance company. It has 1.7 million insured persons paying each year 3.6 billion Swiss francs of insurance premiums. 12. For instance, in Wankdorf-City, the municipality paid 7.3 million Swiss francs for the new railway station and the property tax following the zoning modification was around 9 million Swiss francs, without taking into account the important land rent coming from its own land portfolio. 13. Swiss Prime Site is Switzerland's leading listed real-estate company dealing with a portfolio valued at roughly 10 billion Swiss francs. 14. As the Swiss Confederation is still the only owner of SBB, the railway company as a whole is better understood as a semipublic actor. However, as its real-estate division has to make profit following the will of the federal government, I consider SBB as a private actor. 15. For instance, Knoepfel and his colleagues have already used their typology notably in France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, the United Kingdom, Canada, or the United States. 16. Savitch and Kantor (2002) observed a similar result with Liverpool and Marseilles, two cities that had scarce resources but used them strategically. In contrast, Milan had plenty of resources but did not use them properly.
